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States. And because it is so easy to learn about the choices of "people like you," countless people make the same choices that are made by others like them.
The resulting divisions run along many lines-of religion, ethnicity, nationality, wealth, age, political 
Personalization and Democracy
In many respects, our communications market is rapidly moving in the direction of this apparently utopian picture. As of this writing, many newspapers, including the Wall Street Journal, allow readers to create "personalized" electronic edi tions, containing exactly what they want, and excluding what they do not want.
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If you are interested in getting help with the design of an entirely individual paper, you can consult an ever-growing number of sites, including individual.com (helpfully named!) and crayon.com (a less helpful name, but evocative in its own way). Reddit.com "learns what you like as you vote on existing links or submit your own!" Findory.com will help you to per sonalize not only news, but also blogs, videos, and podcasts. In its own enthusiastic words, "The more articles you click on, the more personalized Findory will look. Our Personalization Technology adapts the website to show you interesting and relevant information based on your reading habits."
If you put the words "personalized news" in any search en gine, you will find vivid evidence of what is happening. Google News provides a case in point, with the appealing suggestion, "No one can read all the news that's published every day, so why not set up your page to show you the stories that best represent your interests?" And that is only the tip of the ice berg. Consider TiVo, the television recording system, which is designed to give "you the ultimate control over your TV viewing." TiVo will help you create "your personal TV line up." It will also learn your tastes, so that it can "suggest other shows that you may want to record and watch based on your preferences." In reality, we are not so very far from complete personalization of the system of communications.
In 1995, MIT technology specialist Nicholas Negroponte prophesied the emergence of "the Daily Me"-a communica tions package that is personally designed, with each compo nent fully chosen in advance.
1 Negroponte's prophecy was not nearly ambitious enough. As it turns out, you don't need to create a Daily Me. Others can create it for you. If people know a little bit about you, they can discover, and tell you, what "people like you" tend to like-and they can create a Daily Me, just for you, in a matter of seconds.
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Many of us are applauding these developments, which ob viously increase fun, convenience, and entertainment. But in the midst of the applause, we should insist on asking some questions. How will the increasing power of private control affect democracy? How will the Internet and the explosion of communications options alter the capacity of citizens to govern themselves? What are the social preconditions for a well-functioning system of democratic deliberation, or for in dividual freedom itself?
My purpose in this book is to cast some light on these ques tions. I do so by emphasizing the most striking power pro vided by emerging technologies, the growing power of con sumers to "filter" what they see. In the process of discussing this power, I will attempt to provide a better understanding of the meaning of freedom of speech in a democratic society.
A large part of my aim is to explore what makes for a wellfunctioning system of free expression. Above all, I urge that in a diverse society, such a system requires far more than re straints on government censorship and respect for individual choices. For the last decades, this has been the preoccupation of American law and politics, and in fact the law and politics of many other nations as well, including, for example, Ger many, France, England, Italy, Russia, and Israel. Censorship is indeed the largest threat to democracy and freedom. But an exclusive focus on government censorship produces serious blind spots. In particular, a well-functioning system of free expression must meet two distinctive requirements.
First, people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in advance. Unplanned, unantici pated encounters are central to democracy itself. Such en counters often involve topics and points of view that people have not sought out and perhaps find quite irritating. They are important partly to ensure against fragmentation and ex
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tremism, which are predictable outcomes of any situation in which like-minded people speak only with themselves. I do not suggest that government should force people to see things that they wish to avoid. But I do contend that in a democracy deserving the name, lives should be structured so that people often come across views and topics that they have not specifi cally selected.
Second, many or most citizens should have a range of com mon experiences. Without shared experiences, a heteroge neous society will have a much more difficult time in ad dressing social problems. People may even find it hard to understand one another. Common experiences, emphatically including the common experiences made possible by the media, provide a form of social glue. A system of communica tions that radically diminishes the number of such experi ences will create a number of problems, not least because of the increase in social fragmentation.
As preconditions for a well-functioning democracy, these requirements hold in any large country. They are especially important in a heterogeneous nation, one that faces an occa sional risk of fragmentation. They have all the more impor tance as each nation becomes increasingly global and each citizen becomes, to a greater or lesser degree, a "citizen of the world." Consider, for example, the risks of terrorism, climate change, and avian flu. A sensible perspective on these risks, and others like them, is impossible to obtain if people sort themselves into echo chambers of their own design.
An insistence on these two requirements should not be rooted in nostalgia for some supposedly idyllic past. With re spect to communications, the past was hardly idyllic. Com pared to any other period in human history, we are in the midst of many extraordinary gains, not least from the stand point of democracy itself. For us, nostalgia is not only unpro
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ductive but also senseless. Things are getting better, not worse. Nor should anything here be taken as a reason for "op timism" or "pessimism," two potential obstacles to clear thinking about new technological developments. If we must choose between them, by all means let us choose optimism.
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But in view of the many potential gains and losses inevitably associated with massive technological change, any attitude of optimism or pessimism is far too general to be helpful. What I mean to provide is not a basis for pessimism, but a lens through which we might understand, a bit better than before, what makes a system of freedom of expression successful in the first place. That improved understanding will equip us to understand a free nation's own aspirations and thus help in evaluating continuing changes in the system of com munications. It will also point the way toward a clearer under standing of the nature of citizenship and of its cultural prerequisites.
As we shall see, it is much too simple to say that any system of communications is desirable if and because it allows indi viduals to see and hear what they choose. Increased options are certainly good, and the rise of countless "niches" has many advantages. But unanticipated, unchosen exposures and shared experiences are important too.
Precursors and Intermediaries
Unlimited filtering may seem quite strange, perhaps even the stuff of science fiction. But in many ways, it is continuous with what has come before. Filtering is inevitable, a fact of life. It is as old as humanity itself. No one can see, hear, or read everything. In the course of any hour, let alone any day, every one of us engages in massive filtering, simply in order C H A P T E R O N E to make life manageable and coherent. Attention is a scarce commodity, and people manage their own attention, some times unconsciously and sometimes deliberately, in order to ensure that they are not overwhelmed.
With respect to the world of communications, moreover, a free society gives people a great deal of power to filter out unwanted materials. Only tyrannies force people to read or to watch. In free nations, those who read newspapers do not read the same newspaper; many people do not read any newspaper at all. Every day, people make choices among magazines based on their tastes and their point of view. Sports enthusiasts choose sports magazines, and in many nations they can choose a magazine focused on the sport of their choice-Basketball Weekly, say, or the Practical Horse man. Conservatives can read National Review or the Weekly Standard; countless magazines are available for those who like cars; Dog Fancy is a popular item for canine enthusiasts; people whose political views are somewhat left of center might like the American Prospect; there is even a magazine called Cigar Aficionado.
These are simply contemporary illustrations of a longstanding fact of life in democratic countries: a diversity of communications options and a range of possible choices. But the emerging situation does contain large differences, stemming above all from a dramatic increase in available op tions, a simultaneous increase in individual control over con tent, and a corresponding decrease in the power of generalinterest intermediaries.
3 These include newspapers, maga zines, and broadcasters. An appreciation of the social func tions of general-interest intermediaries will play a large role in this book.
People who rely on such intermediaries have a range of chance encounters, involving shared experiences with di 8 © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
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verse others, and also exposure to materials and topics that they did not seek out in advance. You might, for example, read the city newspaper and in the process find a range of stories that you would not have selected if you had the power to do so. Your eyes might come across a story about ethnic tensions in Germany, or crime in Los Angeles, or innovative business practices in Tokyo, or a terrorist attack in India, or a hurricane in New Orleans, and you might read those stories although you would hardly have placed them in your Daily Me. You might watch a particular television channel-per haps you prefer channel 4-and when your favorite program ends, you might see the beginning of another show, perhaps a drama or news special that you would not have chosen in advance but that somehow catches your eye. Reading Time or Newsweek, you might come across a discussion of endan gered species in Madagascar or genocide in Darfur, and this discussion might interest you, even affect your behavior, maybe even change your life, although you would not have sought it out in the first instance. A system in which individ uals lack control over the particular content that they see has a great deal in common with a public street, where you might encounter not only friends, but also a heterogeneous array of people engaged in a wide array of activities (including per haps bank presidents, political protesters, and panhandlers).
Some people believe that the mass media is dying-that the whole idea of general-interest intermediaries providing shared experiences and exposure to diverse topics and ideas for millions was a short episode in the history of human com munications. As a prediction, this view seems overstated; even on the Internet, the mass media continues to have a huge role. But certainly the significance of the mass media has been falling over time. We should not forget that from the standpoint of human history, even in industrialized societies,
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general-interest intermediaries are relatively new, and far from inevitable. Newspapers, radio stations, and television broadcasters have particular histories with distinctive begin nings and possibly distinctive endings. In fact the twentieth century should be seen as the great era for the general-interest intermediary, which provided similar information and enter tainment to millions of people.
The twenty-first century may well be altogether different on this score. Consider one small fact: in 1930, daily newspaper circulation was 1.3 per household, a rate that had fallen to less than 0.50 by 2003-even though the number of years of education, typically correlated with newspaper readership, rose sharply in that period. At the very least, the sheer volume of options and the power to customize are sharply diminish ing the social role of the general-interest intermediary.
Politics, Freedom, and Filtering
In the course of the discussion, we will encounter many is sues. Each will be treated in some detail, but for the sake of convenience, here is a quick catalogue:
• the large difference between pure populism, or di rect democracy, and a democratic system that attempts to ensure deliberation and reflection as well as ac countability; • the intimate relationship between free-speech rights and social well-being, which such rights often serve; • the pervasive risk that discussion among like-minded people will breed excessive confidence, extremism, contempt for others, and sometimes even violence;
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• the potentially dangerous role of social cascades, in cluding "cybercascades," in which information, wheth er true or false, spreads like wildfire; • the enormous potential of the Internet and other com munications technologies for promoting freedom in both poor and rich countries; • the utterly implausible nature of the view that free speech is an "absolute"; • the ways in which information provided to any one of us is likely to benefit many of us; • the critical difference between our role as citizens and our role as consumers; • the inevitability of regulation of speech, indeed the in evitability of speech regulation benefiting those who most claim to be opposed to "regulation"; • the extent to which the extraordinary consumption opportunities created by the Internet might not really improve people's lives because for many goods, those opportunities merely accelerate the "consumption treadmill"; • the potentially destructive effects of intense market pressures on both culture and government.
But the unifying issue throughout will be the various prob lems, for a democratic society, that might be created by the power of complete filtering. One question, which I answer in the affirmative, is whether individual choices, innocuous and perfectly reasonable in themselves, might produce a large set of social difficulties. Another question, which I also answer in the affirmative, is whether it is important to maintain the equivalent of "street corners" or "commons" where people are exposed to things quite involuntarily. More particularly, I seek to defend a particular conception of democracy-a delibera
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tive conception-and to evaluate, in its terms, the outcome of a system with perfect power of filtering. I also mean to defend a conception of freedom associated with the delibera tive conception of democracy and to oppose it to a concep tion that sees consumption choices by individuals as the very embodiment or soul of freedom.
My claim is emphatically not that street corners and gen eral-interest intermediaries will or would disappear in a world of perfect filtering. To what extent the market will pro duce them or their equivalents is an empirical issue. Many people like surprises; many of us are curious, and our searches reflect our curiosity. Some people have a strong taste for street corners and for their equivalent on television and the Internet. Indeed, the Internet holds out immense promise for allowing people to be exposed to materials that used to be too hard to find, including new topics and new points of view. If you would like to find out about different forms of cancer and different views about possible treatments, you can do so in less than a minute. If you are interested in learning about the risks associated with different automobiles, a quick search will tell you a great deal. If you would like to know about a particular foreign country, from its customs to its poli tics to its weather, you can do better with the Internet than you could have done with the best of encyclopedias. (The amazing Wikipedia, produced by thousands of volunteers on the Internet, is itself one of the best of encyclopedias.)
Many older people are stunned to see how easy all this is. From the standpoint of those concerned with ensuring access to more opinions and more topics, the new communications technologies can be a terrific boon. But it remains true that many apparent "street corners," on the Internet in particular, are highly specialized, limited as they are to particular views. What I will argue is not that people lack curiosity or that street
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corners will disappear but instead that there is an insistent need for them, and that a system of freedom of expression should be viewed partly in light of that need. What I will also suggest is that there are serious dangers in a system in which individuals bypass general-interest intermediaries and re strict themselves to opinions and topics of their own choos ing. In particular, I will emphasize the risks posed by any situ ation in which thousands or perhaps millions or even tens of millions of people are mainly listening to louder echoes of their own voices. A situation of this kind is likely to produce far worse than mere fragmentation.
What Is and What Isn't the Issue
Some clarifications, designed to narrow the issue, are now in order. I will be stressing problems on the "demand" side on the speech market. These are problems that stem not from the actions of producers, but instead from the choices and preferences of consumers. I am aware that on one view, the most important emerging problems come from large corpora tions, and not from the many millions, indeed billions, of indi viduals who make communications choices. In the long run, however, I believe that some of the most interesting ques tions, and certainly the most neglected ones, involve con sumer behavior. This is not because consumers are usually confused, irrational, or malevolent. It is because choices that seem perfectly reasonable in isolation may, when taken to gether, badly disserve democratic goals.
Because of my focus on the consumers of information, I will not be discussing a wide range of issues that have en gaged attention in the last decade. Many of these issues
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involve the allegedly excessive power of large corporations or conglomerates.
• I will not deal with the feared disappearance of cover age of issues of interest to small or disadvantaged groups. That is decreasingly likely to be a problem. On the contrary, there has been a tremendous growth in "niche markets," serving groups both large and small. With a decrease in scarcity, this trend will inevitably continue. Technological development is a great ally of small groups and minorities, however defined. People with unusual or specialized tastes are not likely to be frozen out of the emerging communications universe. The opposite is much more likely to be true; they will have easy access to their preferred fare-far easier than ever before.
• I will not be exploring the fascinating increase in peo ple's ability to participate in creating widely available information-through art, movies, books, science, and much more. With the Internet, any one of us might be able to make a picture, a story, or a video clip available to all of us; YouTube is merely one example. In this way, the Internet has a powerful democratizing func tion. 4 Countless websites are now aggregating diverse knowledge. Wikipedia, for example, has thousands of authors, and the very form of the wiki allows people to contribute to the creation of a product from which they simultaneously benefit. For diverse products-books, movies, cars, doctors, and much more every day-it is easy to find sources that tell you what most people think, and it is easy as well to contribute to that collec tive knowledge. Prediction markets, for example, ag gregate the judgments of numerous forecasters, and T H E D A I LY M E they are proving to be remarkably accurate. There is much to be said about the growing ability of consumers to be producers too.
5 But that is not my topic here.
• I will provide little discussion of monopolistic behav ior by suppliers or manipulative practices by them. That question has received considerable attention, above all in connection with the 1999-2000 antitrust litigation involving Microsoft. Undoubtedly some sup pliers do try to monopolize, and some do try to manip ulate; consider, for example, the fact that many brows ers provide some automatic bookmarks designed to allow users to link with certain sites but not others. Every sensible producer of communications knows that a degree of filtering is a fact of life. Producers also know something equally important but less obvious: consumers' attention is the crucial (and scarce) com modity in the emerging market. Companies stand to gain a great deal if they can shift attention in one direc tion rather than another. This is why many Internet sites provide information and entertainment to consumers for free. Consumers are actually a commodity, often "sold" to advertisers in return for money; it is therefore advertisers and not consumers who pay. This is pervasively true of radio and television. 6 To a large degree, it is true of websites too. Consider, for example, the hilarious case of Netz ero.com, which provides Internet access. A few years ago, Netzero.com described itself-indeed this was its motto-as "Defender of the Free World." In an exten sive advertising campaign, Netzero.com portrayed its founders as besieged witnesses before a legislative committee, defending basic liberty by protecting every one's "right" to have access to the Internet. But is Netz C H A P T E R O N E ero.com really attempting to protect rights, or is it basi cally interested in earning profits? The truth is that Netzero.com is one of a number of for-profit companies giving inexpensive Internet access to consumers (a so cial benefit to be sure), but making money by promising advertisers that the consumers it services will see their commercials. There is nothing at all wrong with mak ing money, but Netzero.com should hardly be seen as some dissident organization of altruistic patriots.
Especially in light of the overriding importance of at tention, some private companies will attempt to manip ulate consumers, and occasionally they will engage in monopolistic practices. Is this a problem? No unquali fied answer would make sense. An important question is whether market forces will reduce the adverse effects of efforts at manipulation or monopoly. I believe that to a large extent, they will; but that is not my concern here. For a democracy, many of the most serious issues raised by the new technologies do not involve manipulation or monopolistic behavior by large companies.
• I will not be discussing private power over "code," the structure and design of programs. In an illuminating and important book, Lawrence Lessig explored the risk that private code makers will control possibilities on the Internet, in a way that compromises privacy, the free circulation of ideas, and other important social values. 7 As Lessig persuasively demonstrates, this is in deed a possible problem. But the problem should not be overstated, particularly in view of the continuing ef fects of extraordinary competitive forces. The move ment for "open-source" software (above all Linux), in which people can contribute innovations to code, is flourishing, and in any case competitive pressures im
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pose limits on the extent to which code makers may move in directions that consumers reject. Privacy guarantees, for example, are an emerging force on the Internet. Undoubtedly there is room, in some contexts, for a governmental role in ensuring against the abusive exercise of the private power over code. But that is not my concern here.
• In the same vein, I will put to one side the active debate over the uses of copyright law to limit the dissemina tion of material on the Internet and elsewhere. This is an exceedingly important debate, to be sure, but one that raises issues very different from those explored in this book.
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• I will not be discussing the "digital divide," at least not as this term is ordinarily understood. People concerned about this problem emphasize the existing inequality in access to new communications technologies, an in equality that divides, for example, those with and those without access to the Internet. That is indeed an im portant issue, certainly domestically and even more so internationally, because it threatens to aggravate ex isting social inequalities, many of them unjust, at the same time that it deprives many millions (perhaps billions) of people of information and opportunities. But in both the domestic and the international context, that problem seems likely to diminish over time, as new technologies, above all the Internet, are made increasingly available to people regardless of their income or wealth.
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Of course we should do whatever we reasonably can to accelerate the process, which will provide benefits, not least for both freedom and health, for millions and even billions. But what I will describe will operate even
